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Charitable Contributions No Longer
Chargeable as Operating Expenses in Mississippi - State
ex rel. Allain v. MississippiPublic Service Commission, 435
So. 2d 608 (Miss. 1983).
PUBLIC UTILITIES -

INTRODUCTION

Mississippi Power and Light Company filed a Notice of Intention to Change Rates with the Mississippi Public Service Commission on May 28, 1980. The rates, suspended by the commission
pending its hearing, but put into effect under bond by Mississippi Power and Light (MP&L) on July 1, 1980,1 were calculated
to raise $68,786,000.00 in new gross annual revenues for the
1980-81 year. On November 24, 1980, the Public Service Commission entered its order allowing a rate increase sufficient to
produce $48,277,442.00 for the company.2 The Public Service
Commission's order included a finding that $284,000.00 of charitable contributions was an appropriate operating expense for the
year in question. 3
The Mississippi Legal Services Coalition appealed the commission's order to the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District
in Hinds County.' The Attorney General filed a separate appeal
on behalf of the State of Mississippi and the electric power consumers affected by the order. In addition to these appeals, the
Attorney General, the cities of Jackson and Ruleville, the town
of Marigold, and Hinds County filed petitions to intervene as
parties at the chancery court level.' Mississippi Power and Light
Company also filed an appeal assigning errors concerning the commission's failure to grant the company's entire request.' The
chancery court consolidated the appeals and permitted all parties
to participate in the suit. However, prior to judgment, the
chancellor reversed his decision as to the Attorney General,
1. At the time of the suit, public utilities in Mississippi were allowed to put the rates indicated in their
notice into effect by the filing of a bond with the Public Service Commission. Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-39
(1972). This provision has been amended to limit collection of rates under bond to cases where the commission
has failed to render its decision within 120 days of the filing of the notice of intent. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 77-3-39(6) (1972 and Supp. 1983).
2. State ex rel. Allain v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 435 So. 2d 608, 610-11 (Miss. 1983).
3. Id. at 617.
4. The provision for appeals from the Public Service Commission to the Chancery Court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County, effective at the time of the instant case, was Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-67(l) (1972
and Supp. 1982).
5. The City of Cleveland also sought to intervene but withdrew its petition. State ex rel. Allain, 435 So.
2d at 611.
6. Id. at 612.
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denying his petition to intervene. 7 The chancery court's decree
affirmed the commission's order, including the allowance of
charitable contributions as a proper operating expense of the
Mississippi Power and Light Company. 8
The Attorney General, the City of Jackson, the Legal Services
Coalition, and MP&L appealed the chancery court's decision to
the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Attorney General appealed
the denial of his petition to intervene and also included an argument on the merits of the appeal in his brief. In response, MP&L
filed a motion with the supreme court to strike the Attorney
General's assignments of error that referred to the merits of the
chancery court's decision. The supreme court denied this motion,
ruling that the Attorney General's :ommon-law powers included
the right to intervene in appeals affecting the public interest. 9 Thus,
the court recognized the standing of the Attorney General as to
the merits of the appeal.
Mississippi Power and Light Company's plan to include
$284,000.00 of charitable contributions as part of its operating
expenses for the 1980-81 "test year," as approved by the Public
Service Commission and the chancery court, was contested by
the Attorney General and the Legal Services Coalition." The commission and chancery court relied upon the Mississippi Supreme
Court's holding in United Gas Corporationv. Mississippi Public
Service Commission," which allowed contributions in reasonable
amounts to be charged as operating expenses of the utility.1 2 The
supreme court ruled that the commission did not err in applying
the principles of United Gas Corporation v. Mississippi Public
Service Commission in the instant case, but should no longer accept that case's holding as controlling in the area of charitable
contributions." In the future, the commission may not, as a mat"essential cost of
ter of law, consider charitable contributions an
4
conducting the business of a public utility.'
In State ex rel. Allain v. Mississippi Public Service Commission,'5 the Mississippi Supreme Court changed this jurisdiction's
position on the treatment of charitable contributions as an operating

7. Id.at611.
8. Id.
ex rel. Allain v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 1982).
9. State
10. State ex rel. Allain, 435 So. 2d at 611.
1I.240 Miss. 405, 127 So. 2d 404 (1961).
12.id. at 434, 127 So. 2d at416.
13.State ex rel. Allain ,435 So. 2d at 617.
14.Id.
15.435 So. 2d 608.
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expense of a public utility corporation. The case illustrates the
problems surrounding public regulation of a privately-owned corporation with a monopoly in the delivery of electric power.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

I
The question of what is properly charged to the ratepayers as
"operating expenses" is a significant part of the rate-making process. The Mississippi Public Service Commission is directed by
statute to set "fair, just, and reasonable rates for the services
rendered," and yet "yield a fair rate of return to the utility furnishing service, upon the reasonable value of the property of the
utility used or useful in furnishing service." 16 As a practical matter, the balance between the interests of ratepayers and those of
stockholders is achieved by allowing the utility to raise enough
gross revenue to bring a specified "return" in excess of the
reasonable expenses of delivering the service.17 The return, which
represents funds available for dividend payment, surplus account,
and payment of debt,18 is determined by the commission by applying a specified percentage ("rate of return") to the property
used in delivering service ("rate base")." Thus, the sum of the
stockholders' return and the operating expenses of the utility is
the amount raised by the rates ordered by the commission.
Utility rates are set by the Public Service Commission after a
public hearing" and are reviewable by the judiciary.21 The reasonableness of utility rates is a question of fact calling for discretion
on the part of the commission.22 On appeal, the order of the commission is considered primafacie correce3 and will not be set aside
unless there exists a lack of substantial supporting evidence, an
error of law, an overstepping of the statutory limits of the commission's authority, or a violation of constitutional rights."4 If the

16. Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-33(I) (1972).
17. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 45 (1969).

18. id.
19. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 77-3-33(I) to-43 (1972), amendedby Miss. CODE ANN. §77-3-43 (Supp. 1983).
20. MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-3-39 (1972), amended by MIss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-39(l) (Supp. 1983). The
amended version limits the commission's discretionary authority to forego such a hearing.
21. Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-67 (1972), amended by MIss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-67 (Supp. 1983); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 77-3-71 (1972), amended by Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 77-3-71 to -72 (Supp. 1983).
22. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 237 Miss. 157, 238, 113 So. 2d
622, 654 (1959).
23. Loden v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 279 So. 2d 636, 641 (Miss. 1973); Tri-State Transit Co.
v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 197 Miss. 37, 39, 19 So. 2d 441, 443 (1944).
24. Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-67(4) (1972 and Supp. 1982).
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court sets the commission's order aside, it must then remand the
factual questions to the commission and may not substitute a rate
of its own choosing."5 The court's role in review is to determine
whether the commission may consider certain factors in its ratemaking function, such as charitable contributions, the issue faced
by the court in State ex rel. Allain v. Mississippi Public Service
Commission.
Although the charitable contributions issue involved only a fraction of the proposed rate increase, it is significant as a demonstration of an inherent problem in utilities regulation: Need a public
utility corporation conform merely to the standards of competitive
business enterprises, or does its franchised monopoly necessitate
unique standards? Mississippi, like most jurisdictions, has a statute
permitting corporations in general "to make gifts, donations, or
contributions for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific,
religious, or educational purposes, which gifts, donations, or contributions shall be charged by such corporation to operating expenses.""
Several jurisdictions in the United States have taken widely varying views on the inclusion of charitable contributions as operating
expenses of a public utility. The broadest approach permits utilities
to charge donations as expenses so long as the donations do not
exceed a "reasonable" amount, and as long as the contributions
go to "legitimate" or "recognized" charities.7 A second approach
includes the contributions only upon a showing that the utility's
business has been directly benefited by the charity. ' Other jurisdictions, as a matter of law, exclude charitable contributions from
operating expenses altogether on the theory that the ratepayer
should not be compelled to contribute to charity through the payment of utility bills.'" The choice among these theories indicates
the degree of similarity with which the court in question
characterizes the relationship between public utilities and
businesses in general.
II
Those courts that permit "reasonable" contributions to be included as operating expenses emphasize the importance of allowing
25. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. Hughes Tel. Co., 376 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979); Mississippi Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 337 So. 2d 936 (Miss. 1976).
26. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-1-3 (1972).
27. See infra notes 30-54 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
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the utility corporation the same degree of "managerial discretion"
as in the competitive sector of the economy. In New England
Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Department of Public
0 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts cautioned
Utilities,"
its regulatory agency against substituting its judgment for that of
the managers of the company."
In addressing the question of charitable contributions, the court
focused its attention on the broad popularity and general legitimacy
of the institutions to which the company contributed.32 Noting further that the amount of contributions was not found unreasonable
by the State Department of Public Utilities, the court held that
the Department could not exclude those contributions from the
costs of doing business passed on to the ratepayers."
The test for reasonableness of contributions is two-fold: the
amount itself must be reasonable, and the charities must be
legitimate. J" The Mississippi Supreme Court, in United Gas Corporationv. Mississippi Public Service Commission, left the question of reasonableness of amount to the commission as a finding
of fact, allowing for a finding that the donations were excessive. 5
The New York Public Service Commission determines reasonableness of amount by comparison to similarly situated utilities and
to contributions during the period in New York when donations
were not chargeable to expenses.' The Massachusetts court leaves
the initial determination to the directors of the utility in their
"managerial discretion"; the Department of Public Utilities may
only decide if the amount is unreasonably excessive."'
Reasonableness of amount has on one occasion stood alone as a
criterion for inclusion of donations; in a jurisdiction which otherwise would have excluded the contribution, the minute amount
in question was the determining factor.3
The legitimacy of the charitable donee as a requirement for inclusion of the contribution is an attempt to prevent "impropriety
in the selection of beneficiaries."39 For this purpose the Federal
30. 360 Mass. 443, 275 N.E.2d 493 (1971).
31. Id. at 483-84, 275 N.E.2d at 517.
32. Id. at 485, 275 N.E.2d at 518.
33. Id. at 489, 275 N.E.2d at 521.
34. Id.; City of Miami v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 208 So. 2d 249, 259 (Fla. 1968); United Gas Corp.
v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. 405, 434, 127 So. 2d 404, 416 (1961); Re United Gas Pipe
Line Co., 54 Pus. UTIL. REP. 3rd (PUR) 285, 295 (F.P.C. 1964).
35. 240 Miss. at 434, 127 So. 2d at 416.
36. Re New York Tel. Co., 84 PuB. UTIL. REP. 3rd (PUR) 321, 350 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
360 Mass at 489, 275 N.E.2d at 521.
37. New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util.,
38. Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 F. 208, 226 (D. Alaska 1923). modified on other grounds, 271 U.S.
131 (1926); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 12 N.J. 568, 597, 97 A.2d 602,616 (1953).
39. New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v.Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. at 489. 275 N.E.2d at 521.
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Power Commission has suggested the use of the Internal Revenue
Code's criteria for charitable organizations as a test of legitimacy."'
A "legitimate" donee has also been defined as a "local, established
charity," contributions to which will build the goodwill of the utility
in the community. 1
The rationale behind the "reasonableness" criteria is based on
the similarity of public utility corporations to businesses in the
competitive sector. Public utility managers, it is said, should be
granted the same degree of "managerial discretion" as is present
in other enterprises. 2 Public utilities, like corporations, are
authorized by statute to contribute to charities, and it would be
incongruous to allow the corooration to pass such donations on
to its customers, while requiring the stockholders of the utility
to "foot the bill" for their donations. 3 Utilities make contributions
for the same reason as private sector corporations - to build goodwill in the community; 4 indeed, utilities are expected to give to
charitable organizations and will lose community support if they
refuse.
The need for a public utility to build its image in the community by making charitable contributions is comparable to its need
to advertise.4 ' Four types of advertising by public utilities may
be distinguished - institutional, to increase the public opinion
of the utility; promotional, to generate new customers; informa40. Re United Gas Pipe Line Co., 54 PUB. UTIL. REP. 3rd (PUR) 285, 295 (F.P.C. 1964).
41. In re Diamond State Tel. Co., 103 A.2d 304, 323 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954), affd in part and revd in
part on other grounds, 48 Del..497, 107 A.2d 786 (1954), modified on other grounds, 49 Del. 203, 113 A.2d
437 (1955); City of Cincinnati v. Public Util. Comm'n, 55 Ohio St. 2d 168, 173, 378 N.E.2d 729, 733 (1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979).
42. Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 57 F.2d 735, 753 (D. Colo. 1932); New England Tel.
and Tel. Co. v.Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. at 483, 489, 275 N.E.2d at 517, 521 (1971).
43. Re New York Tel. Co., 84 PUB. UTIL. REP. 3d (PUR) 321, 349-50 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970);
Accounting Treatment for Donations, Dues, and Lobbying Expenditures, 7 PUB. UTIL. REP. 3d (PUR) 440,
445 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1967).
44. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 192 Kan. 39, 73, 386 P.2d 515, 545 (1923). Accord Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 57 F.2d 735, 753 (D. Colo. 1932); In re Diamond State
Tel. Co., 51 Del. 525, 536-37, 149 A.2d 324, 331 (1959); City of Miami v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 208 So.
662 P.2d 264, 268 (Kan.
2d 249, 259 (Fla. 1968); Gas Serv. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 8 Kan. App. 545, 550-51,
Ct. App. 1983); New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360, Mass. 443, 489, 275 N.E.2d
493, 521 (1971); United Gas Corp. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. 405, 434, 127 So. 2d 404,
416 (1961); Public Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. 150, 161, 153 A.2d 801, 809 (1959); City of Cincinnati
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 55 Ohio St. 2d 168, 173, 378 N.E.2d 729, 732-33 (1978); United Transit Co. v.
Nunes, 99 R.I. 501, 513-14, 209 A.2d 215, 222 (1965); Howell v. Chesapeake and Potomic Tel. Co., 215
Va. 549, 559, 211 S.E.2d 265, 272 (1975); Board of Supervisors v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 196 Va.
1102, 1118, 87 S.E.2d 139, 149 (1955). Contra Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 359
So. 2d 776, 779 (Ala. 1978); New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8, 55 (Me. 1978).
45. New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util. 360 Mass. 443, 484, 489, 275 N.E.2d
493, 517, 521 (1971); Public Serv. Corp. v. State, 102 N.H. 150, 161, 153 A.2d 801, 809 (1959). Contra
Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 359 So. 2d 776, 779 (Ala. 1978); Illinois Bell Tel. Co.
v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 II1. 2d 461, 481, 303 N.E.2d 364, 375 (1973).
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tional, to disseminate rate charges and benefits; and conservational, to aid the customer in reducing his energy usage. 6
Donations by utilities fulfill the same function as institutional
advertising, and several states that permit institutional advertising to be charged to operating expenses will also allow charitable
contributions the same treatment. 7
The "goodwill" or "public benefit" rationale is often given the
status of an element of reasonableness, as in the Mississippi
Supreme Court's statement in United Gas Corporationv. Mississippi Public Service Commission: "The contributions to charity must
be made to a proper object and in reasonable amounts, and be
related to the fostering of the goodwill of the company in the
localities in which it operates. 4 8 Other courts state the test only
in terms of reasonableness but ground the rationale for that test
in the "goodwill" theory. 9 That is to say, public utility corporations may rightfully charge donations to operating expenses, for,
as in the case of private sector corporations, they fulfill the business
purpose of building goodwill. The commission, however, may
disallow the donations if they are unreasonable in amount or given
to a sham charity."
Reasonableness, both in amount given and legitimacy of donee,
is a question of fact which may be determined by the given
regulatory agency." 1 As a result, upon review, state courts tend
to affirm decisions by state commissions allowing the inclusion
of donations. 2 The purpose of the reasonableness test, whether
applied by the regulatory agencies or by the courts, is to carefully

46. City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 63 Ohio St.2d 62, 70-73, 406 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 (1980);
PromotionalPractices of Public Utilities and Cooperative Utilities Ass ns, 97 PUB. SERV. REP. 3d (PUR) 1,
4 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n 1972).
47. New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. at 484, 489, 275 N.E.2d at
517, 521 (1971); Public Serv. Corp. v. State, 102 N.H. at 161, 153 A.2d at 809, Contra Alabama Power
Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Commn, 359 So. 2d at 779; Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commh,
55 1l.2d at 481, 303 N.E.2d at 375.
48. United Gas Corp., 240 Miss. at 434, 127 So. 2d at 416.
49. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Commn, 192 Kan. at 73, 386 P.2d at 545; Gas Serv. Co.
v. State Corp. Comm'n, 8 Kan. App. 2d at 551-52, 662 P.2d at 268.
50. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm n, 192 Kan. at 73, 386 P.2d at 545; Gas Serv. Co.
v. State Corp. Comm'n, 8 Kan. App. 2d at 551-52, 662 P.2d at 268.
51. United Gas Corp. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. at 434, 127 So. 2d at 416.
52. Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 57 F.2d at 753; In Re Diamond State Tel. Co., 51
Del. at 537, 149 A.2d at 331; City of Miami v. FloridaPub. Serv. Comm'n, 208 So. 2d at 258; Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 192 Kan. at 73, 386 P.2d at 545; New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v.
Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. at 489, 275 N.E.2d at 521; United Gas Corp. v. Mississippi Pub. Sere.
Comm'n, 240 Miss. at 434, 127 So. 2d at 416; Public Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. at 161, 153 A.2d at 809;
City of Cincinnati v. Public Util. Caomn, 55 Ohio St.2d at 173, 378 N.E.2d at 733; Providence Gas Co.
v. Burman, 119 R.I. at 99-100, 376 A.2d 687, 699 (1977); United Transit Co. v. Nunes, 99 RI. at 513-14,
209 A.2d at 222 (1965); Howell, 215 Va. at 559, 211 S.E.2d at 272; Board of Supervisors v. Virginia Elec.
and Power Co., 196 Va. at 1118, 87 S.E.2d at 149.
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examine the utility managers' decision to donate in order to prevent abusive and excessive contributions which would tend to drive
up utility rates. Assuming a basic similarity between public utility
corporations and the private sector economy, jurisdictions using
this test seek only the assurance that a "market economy" business
would grant an equivalent amount of charity to any given donee."
However, the scrutiny to be applied at the commission level is
Corporation Comnot toothless. The Kansas courts allow the State
4
mission to apply a "strict scrutiny" test.III
The foundation for a more narrow view of utility contributions
to charity is found in some jurisdictions in statutory authority.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Jewell v. Washington
Utilities and TransportationCommission,"5 fashioned its test for
the inclusion of charitable contributions as operating expenses with
a statute which calls on the state commission to set rates which
are "fair, just, reasonable, and sufficient to allow the telephone
company to render prompt, expeditious and efficient service.""6
The issue was whether charitable contributions were necessary
for the company to render such service. The court found that the
donations were not necessary and excluded them from the company's operating expenses. 7 The company had argued that it was
both socially appropriate and expected that utilities would make
contributions to charity and that a separate statute authorized corporate donations. 8 The court set these propositions aside, noting
that General Telephone Company, as a publicly-regulated monopoly, is not to be confused with a private corporation but is statutorily
limited in its rates to that which is necessary to render service. 9
The Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar result in City of
Cleveland v. Public Utilities Commission."0 Relying on the commission's enabling statute, 1 the court decided that the commission had no authority to include charitable contributions in
53. Re New York Tel. Co., 84 PuB. UTIL. REP. 3d (PUR) 321, 350 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
54. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 192 Kan. at 73, 386 P.2d at 545.
55. 90 Wash. 2d 775, 585 P.2d 1167 (1978).
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.36.080 (1974), as interpreted in Jewell, 90 Wash. 2d at 776, 585 P.2d at 1167.
57. Id. at 777, 585 P.2d at 1169.
58. Id. at 778-79, 585 P.2d at 1169-70.
59. Id. at 780, 585 P.2d at1170. A well reasoned dissent challenged this conclusion on grounds that a
public utility corporation is entitled to all the expenses of a private sector corporation but is merely governed
by the regulatory process rather than the market. The dissent went on to accept the "reasonable contributions"
test. Id. at 782, 585 P.2d at 1172 (Dolliver, J.,dissenting).
60. 63 Ohio St. 2d 62, 406 N.E.2d 1370 (1980).
61, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4909.15(A) (4) (Baldwin 1978), which provides: "The public utilities commission, when fixing and determining just and reasonable rates, fares, tolls, rentals and charges shall determine . . . [tihe cost to the utility of rendering the public utility service ...."
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operating expenses unless such donations could be related to "the
cost of rendering the public utility service."" The court formulated
a test which requires an expense item to provide a "direct, primary
benefit" to consumers," that is, by reducing the cost of service,
or providing more efficient service. As to the contributions claimed
in the case in question, no direct, primary benefit was found to
exist. The contributions were disallowed." This opinion was later
interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court as holding that no contribution to charity can bear a direct, primary relationship to providing service, thus excluding all contributions from operating
expenses. 6
The same result has been reached without reliance on statutes.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that charitable contributions were incongruous with the ultimate purpose of the utility
and therefore should not be an excuse to increase company funds."
The question posed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey was
whether the contribution "has an effect upon the creation of the
service or product of the corporation and therefore may be considered as reasonably necessary in the rendition of service to the
consumer."67 In the District of Columbia, the criterion established
was whether the given expense item (here charitable contributions) more directly benefited the stockholders or the utility's
ratepayers.6
Whether the "direct benefit" requirement is a test for inclusion,
rather than a rationale for exclusion, is open to question. Two
states, Ohio and Illinois, which had stated the "direct benefit" requirement, in later cases excluded charitable contributions as a
matter of law. 9 Other jurisdictions that have the test in theory
seem not to allow contributions in practice.7" It would appear that
62. City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 406 N.E.2d at 1377.
63. Id. at 73, 406 N.E 2d at 1378.
64. Id. at 73-74, 406 N.E.2d at 1379-80.
65. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 258, 260-61, 431 N.E.2d
683, 685 (1982).
66. Carey v. Corporation Comm'n, 168 Okla. 487, 492, 33 P.2d 788, 794 (1934).
67. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 12 N.J. 568, 596-97, 97 A.2d 602, 616 (1953).
See also Reno Power, Light & Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 298 F. 790, 801 (D. Nev. 1923); Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 I11.31, 64, 25 N.E.2d 482, 498 (1939), appeal denied, 309 U.S. 634
(1940); Solar Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. 325, 379, 9 A.2d 447, 479 (1939).
68. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 450 A.2d 1187, 1231 (D.C. 1982).
69. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 258, 431 N.E.2d 683 (1982)
(excluded as a matter of law). Cf City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Conmn, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 73-74, 406
N.E.2d at 1379 (direct benefit test); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comn, 55 l. 2d at 481,
303 N.E.2d at 375 (excluded as a matter of law); Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 373 nl1.at 64, 25 N.E.2d
at 498 ("peculiar benefit" required). In Illinois, contributors are now included by statute, ILL ANN. STAT. ch.
Ill 2/3, § 41 (Smith-Hurd 1966 and Supp. 1985).
70. Maplewood Disposal Co., 11 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 373, 377 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1975);
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 2 PuB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 417, 437 (Penn. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1973).
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the test is phrased such that, absent a broad interpretation of
"benefit," contributions are more often excluded than included."1
To help minimize the monopoly status of a public utility corporation, the "direct benefit" requirement is an attempt to limit
the utility's expenses that can be passed on to the ratepayers. 72
This attempt is based on the statutory limits placed on the
regulatory agency's authority to include certain items as operating
expenses of a public utility.73 But it does not extend so far as to
explicitly exclude charitable contributions as a matter of law. This
is left to the approach known as the "involuntary levy" theory.

IV
"Ifcharitable contributions are allowed as an operating expense
of a monopoly, its [sic] amounts to an involuntary levy on the
ratepayers." 4 With these words, Maryland's highest court, in
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company v. Public Service
Commission,"5 forged from a series of less forthright cases76 an
unequivocal rule: Contributions are to be excluded from operating
expenses as a matter of law. This decision was cited by the California Supreme Court in Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Public Utilities Commission.77 California's Public Utilities
Commission had allowed the company to charge the great majority of its donations to operating expenses in its order, but the
commission warned the company that it intended to adopt a policy
of complete exclusion of charitable contributions in the future.78
The commission explained the rationale behind its new policy:
Dues, donations, and contributions, if included as an expense for rate-making purposes,
become an involuntary levy on ratepayers who, because of the monopolistic nature of utility

71.Reno Power, Light and Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 298 F. at 801 (excluded contributions);
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 111.2d
at 481. 303 N.E.2d at 375; Peoples Gas, Light,
& Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. at64, 25 N.E.2d at498; New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub.
Util., 12 N.J. at 596-97, 97 A.2d at 616 (included contribution on basis of test and minuteness of amount);
Solar Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. at 379, 9 A.2d at 475; City of Cleveland
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 73-74, 406 N.E.2d at 1379; Jewell, 90 Wash. 2d at 777, 585 P.2d
at 1169. Contra Vrtjak v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 32 PUB. UTIL. REP. 3d (PUR) 385 (I11.
Commerce Comm'n
1959) (included contribution on basis of broad definition of "benefit").
72. Jewell, 90 Wash. 2d at780, 585 P.2d at 1170-71.
73. id. at 776, 585 P.2d at 1169; City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Commn, 63 Ohio St.2d at70, 406
N.E.2d at 1379.
74. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel.Co.v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 230 Md. 395, 414, 187 A.2d 475, 485
(1963).
75. 230 Md. 395, 187 A.2d 475.
76. Peoples Gas Light
& Coke Co. v.Slattery,
373 Ill.
31,64, 25 N.E.2d 482, 498: Central
Maine Power
Co. v.Public
Util.
Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 233, 136 A.2d 726. 731 (1957);
Carey v.Corporation Comm'n,
168 Okla. 487, 492, 33 P.2d 788, 794 (1934).
77. 66 Cal.2d 634, 401 P.2d 353, 44 Cal. Rptr. I (1965).
78. Re Pacific
Tel.and Tel.
Co., 53 PUB. UTIL. REP.3d (PUR)513, 586 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1964).
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service, are unable to obtain service from another source and thereby avoid such a levy
....Respondent should not be permitted to be generous with ratepayers' money but may
use its own funds in any lawful manner."

The California Supreme Court quoted this language with
approval ,so authorizing the commission's exclusionary policy on
grounds that a public utility, as a monopoly, cannot be treated
similarly to a private sector corporation.81 Jurisdictions following the involuntary levy theory likewise rely on the monopolistic
nature of utilities as the major rationale for exclusion. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, in New England Telephone and Telegraph
Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 2 expanded its prior,
more cryptic rationale in CentralMaine Power Company v. Public
Utilities Commission, 3 which granted the commission authority
to disallow charitable contributions completely. The court in New
England Telephone and Telegraph, in adopting the "involuntary
levy" rationale, noted that, inasmuch as a utility corporation has
a monopoly in its given market, it has no real necessity to build
goodwill as argued by proponents of the "reasonable contribution" theory."4 Thus, according to the Maine court, it was valid
for the commission to distinguish between private sector corporations and public utilities in the treatment of charitable contributions.
Similarly, a Missouri appellate court held that the Public Service Commission could exclude both charitable contributions and
institutional advertising (advertising calculated to build public relations for the company) from operating expenses. "While all donations were to be excluded as a matter of law, the court allowed
institutional advertising to be included if such advertising could
be used to "benefit all ratepayers."' The Alabama Supreme Court,
on the other hand, allowed the inclusion of institutional
advertising 7 but disallowed charitable contributions as a matter
of law.8 The inherent contradiction between including "goodwill"
79. Id. at 586.
80. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal.2d 634, 668, 401 P.2d 353, 374, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 1,22 (1965).
81. Accord Southern New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 29 Conn. Supp. 253, 274,
282 A.2d 915, 926 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970); State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co.. 536 P.2d 887, 893 (Okla.
1975).
82. 390 A.2d 8 (Me. 1978).
83. 153 Me. 228, 233, 136 A.2d 726, 731 (1957) (Iclontribution to charity come Isic] from the stockholders.
nor need it give its money to charities, no matter how deserving.").
* . .The company is not compelled ...
Comm n, 390 A.2d at 55. Contra Southwestern Bell
84. New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v.Public Util.
Tel. Co. v.State Corp. Comm n, 192 Kan. at 73, 386 P.2d at 545; New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. at 489, 275 N.E.2d at 521.
85. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222, 228-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
86. Id. at 228. Accord State v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887. 894-95 (Okla. 1975).
87. Alabama Power Co. v.Alabama Pub. Serv. Commn, 359 So. 2d at 780.
88. Id. at 779-80.
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advertising, while excluding contributions presumably calculated
to increase public relations in the community, was not lost on the
dissent.89 Ohio more reasonably excludes both institutional advertising and charitable contributions, on the theory that utilities, as
monopolies, do not have the same need to build "goodwill" as
does a company in the competitive sector.9"
Upon the foundation of the distinction between public utilities
and private sector corporations, the involuntary levy theory has
established two principles: first, since ratepayers have only one
company to choose from when purchasing a certain service, the
inclusion of a contribution in the ratepayer's bill constitutes an
involuntary contribution by the ratepayer to the recipients of the
company's graciousness; 91 and second, utility companies as
monopolies have little need to seek out public "goodwill" and in
that sense may rightfully be treated differently from private sector corporations. 92 For these reasons, although public utilities may
freely donate to charitable causes, jurisdictions under the "involuntary levy" doctrine do not permit such donations to be charged
to operating expenses."
WHERE DOES MISSISSIPPI STAND?

The Mississippi Supreme Court, in United Gas Corporationv.
Mississippi Public Service Commission, " reversed the Public Service Commission's order that excluded charitable contributions
from the company's operating expenses.9S The commission had
held that charitable contributions were better charged to the utili-

89. Id. at 781 (Jones, J., dissenting).
90. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 258, 431 N.E.2d 683 (1982)
(charitable contributions excluded from operating expenses as a matter of law): City of Cleveland v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 62, 70-73, 406 N.E.2d 1370, 1378-79 (1980) (institutional advertising disallowed,
unless unusual necessity shown).
91. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 668, 401 P.2d 353, 374, 44 Cal.
Rptr. I. 22 (1965); Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n. 29 Conn. Supp. 253, 274, 282
A.2d 915, 926 (1970): Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 111.2d 461, 481. 303 N.E.2d
364, 375 (1973): Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 190 N.W.2d 583, 607-08 (Iowa
1971); New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8. 55 (Me. 1978); Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 230 Md. 395. 414, 187 A.2d 475, 485 (1963); State ex rel. Laclede
Gas. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State of North Carolina ex
rel. Util. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 24 N.C. App. 327, 210 S.E.2d. 543, 549 (1975); Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 258, 261, 431 N.E.2d 683. 685-86 (1982);
State v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887, 891-92 (Okla. 1975).
92. Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Commn, 359 So. 2d at 779; New England Tel. and Tel.
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 390 A.2d at 55.
93. State v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co., 536 P.2d at 893.
94. 240 Miss. 405, 127 So. 2d 404,
95. Id. at 434, 127 So. 2d at 416.
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ty's stockholders than to the ratepayers."' The supreme court, in
rebuttal, noted the importance of utility contributions in discharging the civic responsibilities of the company.97
The court's decision made use of the "reasonable contributions"
theory. The commission was given a three-fold test for determining
whether a utility's charitable donations may be included as operating expenses: 1) propriety or legitimacy of donee; 2) reasonableness of amount; and 3) relationship to fostering goodwill of
the company in its service area." In this case, the legitimacy of
the donees was not in question. The court made no finding as to
whether these contributions which totaled $2,707.00 in 1957 and
$1,136.00 in 1958, 99 were in fact intended to "foster goodwill of
the company in the localities in which it operates,"0 ° though it
would appear that most donations by definition would meet this
requirement. 1 ' In 1961, after the United Gas Corporationdecision, 02 Mississippi became a bulwark of the "reasonable contributions" theory. Other jurisdictions adopting the test cited United
Gas for support.'
In 1983, however, the court was persuaded that the principles
of United Gas were no longer applicable to the regulation of public
utilities in Mississippi."' The State ex rel. Allain decision acknowledged both the dependence of charitable organizations on
business contributions and the benefit of added "goodwill" the company could receive from the community as a result of the donations. " 'But two factors induced the court to abandon its position
in United Gas. The first was the spiral of inflation in the area
of energy costs, causing a significant increase in the average
ratepayer's utility bill."'6 Inflationary pressures were reflected in
the donations themselves; the 1980-81 test year donations of
96. Id. at 433, 127 So. 2d at 416; Cf Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 233.
136 A.2d 726, 731 (1957) (precursor to involuntary levy theory, cited in Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. and
Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 230 Md. at 414, 187 A.2d at 485).
97. United Gas Corp. v.Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. at 434, 127 So. 2d at 416.
98. Id. The court cited In re Diamond State Tel. Co., 51 Del. at 536-37, 149 A.2d at331.
99. United Gas Corp. v.Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. at 433, 127 So. 2d at 416.
100. Id. at 434, 127 So. 2d at 416.
101. In fact, in those jurisdictions that follow the "reasonable contributions" approach, the donations are
of Miami v.Florida Pub.
uniformly held to have achieved the purpose of "building goodwill." See, e.g., City
Sen. Comm h,208 So. 2d at 258-59; Providence Gas Co. v.Buman, 119 R.I. at 99-100. 376 A.2d at 698-99;
United Transit Co. v.Nunes, 99 R.I. at 513-14, 709 A.2d at 222; Howell, 215 Va.at 559, 211 S.E.2d at 272.
102. 240 Miss. 405, 127 So. 2d 404 (1961).
103. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 192 Kan. at 60-61, 386 P.2d at 534-35; New England
Tel. and Tel. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. at 488-89, 275 N.E.2d at 520.
104. State ex rel. Allain, 435 So. 2d at 617.
105. Id.
106. The court noted that "circumstances have drastically changed since 1961 when the cost of utility service
was relatively inexpensive ...." Id.
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MP&L totaled $284,000.00 as compared to the donations of
$2,707.00 and $1,136.00 for the two years examined in the United
Gas case."" Given the state of the economy, especially in the
energy sector, the court reasoned that no addition to the ratepayers'
bills could be justified, regardless of amount: "[I]n the present
economy future customers should not be burdened with this cost,
however small." 108
The second factor cited by the court as its reason for changing
its position regarding charitable donations was that, in 1961, "the
argument was not ...advanced that the donations of a utility
might include charities, or other recipients, not satisfactory to the
ratepayers." " This language is similar to that used by the California Supreme Court in Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company
v. Public Utilities Commission,"' a leading case for the "involuntary levy" doctrine. It is important to note that the cases developing this theory were decided after the Mississippi court was
confronted with the issue in United Gas Corporation.1" In United
Gas, the Public Service Commission relied on the conclusionary
rationale found in Central Maine Power Company v. Public
Utilities Commission,. 2 and did not attack the "involuntary contributions" of the ratepayers specifically." By 1983, the supreme
court was amenable to the "involuntary levy" rationale and was
willing to review its earlier discussion in that light." '
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

It is precisely this dual rationale of the court in State ex rel.
Allain, however, that leads to confusion as to the actual stance
of this jurisdiction with regard to operating expenses of a public
utility. The court's affirmation of the "public relations benefits"
received by the donor utility.. 5 is more harmonious with the
"reasonable contributions" theory's analogy between private cor-

107. Id.; United Gas Corp. v.MississippiPub. Serv. Commi, 240 Miss. at 433, 127 So. 2d at 416.
108. State ex relAllain, 435 So. 2d at 617.
109. Id.
110. 62 Cal. 2d at 668, 401 P.2d at 374, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 22. The California court stated: "[Conceding
worthiness of the donees and benefits ingood will reaped by Pacific, many ratepayers may not approve various
of the donations made and they should be permitted to exercise their own free choice in such matters."
Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v.Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal.2d at 668-69, 401 P.2d at 374-75, 44 Cal.
11l.
Rptr. at 22; Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commi, 190 N.W.2d at 608; Chesapeakeand
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 230 Md. at 414, 187 A.2d at 485.
112. 153 Me. 228, 233-34, 136 A.2d 726, 731 (1957).
113. United Gas Corp. v. MississippiPub. Serv. Commn'n, 240 Miss. at 433-34, 127 So. 2d at 416.
114. State ex rel. Allain, 435 So. 2d at 617.
115. Id.
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porations and public utilities, 16 than with the "involuntary levy"
approach's distinction between the "goodwill" needs of each." 7
In terms of the first part of the court's rationale, the opinion
indicates that the logical basis of the "reasonable contributions"
theory is still intact but is no longer applicable because of the "age
of soaring costs" in the delivery of electric power."' This is tantamount to holding that the "reasonable contributions" theory is
still intact in principle but as a matter of law no contribution can
be considered reasonable to pass on to an already burdened
ratepayer. "9
Such a conclusion, however, is inimical to the considerable case
law in Mississippi deferring questions of fact to the Public Service Commission rather than to the judiciary.1" ' The function of
rate-making is purely legislative in character,121 delegated by the
legislature to the Public Service Commission. 22 If charitable contributions do indeed benefit public utilities by increasing their good
will in the community," 3 then the question of reasonableness of
amount, as a factual question, should be determined by the commission. Clearly, the court may set limits beyond which no amount
can be reasonable but to set that amount at $0.00, while granting
in theory the worthwhile benefits of such donations (and further,
the company's need to make them) seems anomalous.
To deny the power of the Public Service Commission to allow
charitable contributions as operating expenses as a matter of law,
the court could have relied more heavily on its "involuntary levy"
language, which formed the second prong of its rationale." ' The
court could have reasoned, as other jurisdictions have, that public
utilities have much less need for "goodwill" than does the company in the private, competitive sector of the economy."' A statute
under consideration by the legislature at the time of the decision,
116. City of Miami v. FloridaPub. Serv. Conm'n, 208 So. 2d at 259; Gas Serv. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n,
8 Kan. App. at 550-51, 662 P.2d at 268; New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360
Mass. at 489, 275 N.E.2d at 521; Public Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. at 160-61, 153 A.2d at 809; United
Transit Co. v. Nunes, 99 R.1. at 513-14, 209 A.2d. at 222; Howell, 215 Va. at 559, 211 S.E.2d at 272; Board
of Supervisors v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 196 Va. at 1118, 87 S.E.2d at 149.
117. Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm)n, 359 So. 2d at 779-80; New England Tel. and
Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 390 A.2d at 55.
118. State ex rel. Allain, 435 So. 2d at 617.
119. Id.
120. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Hughes Tel. Co., Inc., 376 So. 2d 1074, 1079 (Miss. 1979); Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 337 So. 2d 936, 938 (Miss. 1976).
121. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Home Tel. Co., 236 Miss. 444, 461, 110 So. 2d 618, 626 (1959).
122. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 77-3-41 (1972 and Supp. 1982).
123. State ex rel. Allain, 435 So. 2d at 617.
124. Id.
125. Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 359 So. 2d at 779-80; New England Tel. and
Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 390 A.2d at 55.
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and subsequently passed, excluded promotional and institutional
advertising from operating expenses.16 Instead, the opinion relies,
rather vaguely, on the fact that some ratepayers might not approve of the donees of the utility. 27 This, without the distinction
between public utilities and private corporations, is not relevantno consumer is asked to approve of the contributions of the latter, which are, by statute, included in operating expenses."'
The decisive difference between the "reasonable contributions"
theory and the "involuntary levy" approach is the way in which
public utility corporations are compared to the private, competitive
sector of the economy. The Mississippi court, while excluding
charitable contributions as a matter of law, failed to base this
holding on the distinction between a utility's need for "goodwill"
and that of private sector corporations. Instead, the court founded its decision on the current economic climate in the delivery
of electric power. For the supreme court, the mere fact that the
service itself was costly was enough to justify the conclusion that
a cost of business, conceded to have beneficial results, should not
be added to the charge to the consumer."9
The charitable contributions discussion in State ex rel. Allain
v. Mississippi Public Service Commission3 ' makes clear the court's
intent to disallow such contributions as an item of operating ex" ' But the court's failure to resolve this issue
pense in the future. 13
by reference to the nature of a public utility, in comparison to
that of a private corporation, mars its rationale. As a result, State
ex rel. Allain will likely not endure as long as its predecessor,
United Gas Corporation.3 When the economy shifts, the court's
position on the validity of a utility's charitable contributions may
change yet again.
James W. Craig

126. Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-36(2) (Supp. 1984).
127. -[Tlhe donations of a utility might include charities, or other recipients, not satisfactory to the ratepayers."
State ex rel. Allain, 435 So. 2d at 617.
128. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-1-3 (1972).
129. State ex rel. Allain, 435 So. 2d at 617.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 240 Miss. 405, 127 So. 2d 404 (1961).

